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Accessibility constraints When dealing with anaphora resolution, anaphoric expressions are often con-
sidered to have access to a restricted set of discourse referents. The choice of the relevant discourse
referent inside this set may depends on various kinds of information (morphosyntactic features, seman-
tic features, salience. . . ). But theories that give a dynamic interpretation of language also provide some
ways to restrict the set of discourse referents by stating accessibility constraints.
The description of these constraints depends on the chosen formal theory of discourse interpretation.
For instance, DRT [5] describes the accessibility constraints using DRS subordination. Taking into
account the hierarchical structure of discourse, SDRT [2] uses DRS subordination together with an
outscoping relation between discourse units. In both cases, the constraints are based on the structure
of the discourse: for DRT, the structure arises from the negation while for SDRT it also arises from the
nature of the relation between discourse units. In the latter case, it gives a formal definition of the Right
Frontier Constraint (RFC) [1].
[3] proposes a modelling of DRT that fits Montague’s semantic framework. In this approach, the
logical quantifiers have their standard scoping definitions and free and bound variables also have their
standard definitions. One of the advantages is to use standard notions (such as De Bruijn’s indices
for λ-calculus) for implementing variable renaming in semantic systems based on λ-calculus, instead
of implementing specific and complex work-around. [3] also advocates its independence from any
specific theory. While [3] exemplifies the DRT view on accessibility constraints, the work we propose
here consists in exploring this approach in modelling two other kinds of accessibility constraints: the
accessibility to proper nouns in DRT and the RFC.
A Montagovian flavour of DRT In [3], the syntactic type of sentences s is interpreted with the semantic
type: Js K = γ → (γ → t) → t. It means that (the semantic interpretation of) a sentence, instead of
being a proposition, requires two arguments to produce a proposition. The first argument is its left
context (we can think about it as the current set of discourse referents). The second argument is its right
context, or its continuation: something able to return a proposition if fed with a (potentially updated) set
of discourse referents.
Two sentences s1 and s2 are combined in the following way: Js1.s2 K = λeφ.Js1 K e (λe′.Js2 K e′ φ).
It means that the result of the combination of s1 and s2 takes as input an environment e and a continuation
φ. This environment is the same as the one s1 has access to. So Js1 K takes e as first parameter. Then, the
continuation of s1 is made of something taking e′ as left environment1 and the final result is the one we
get by feeding s2 with the new left environment e′ and the same continuation as the s1.s2 combination.
With this interpretation and the right semantic recipes (see [3] for the detailed lexical semantics) we
get the following interpretation for John loves a woman: λeφ.∃y.woman y ∧ love j y ∧ φ (y :: e) where
:: (of type e → γ → γ) is a function that adds a discourse referent to a set of discourse referents. Note
1Note that the actual value of e′ will be provided by the semantic recipe of s1. That is s1 can choose to update or not e
before it gives it as parameter to its continuation.
that the continuation of this sentence, φ, will be provided with the y discourse referent, bound in the
standard way by the existential quantifier.
Modelling other accessibility constraints To state as in DRT that negation blocks the access to dis-
course referents, [4] interprets: J(doesn’t VP)S K = λeφ.¬((VPS) e (λe′.⊤)) ∧ φ e. The continuation
of the sentence (φ) has no access to what VP and S could introduce as discourse referents, it only has
access to the discourse referents of e2.
Note that an alternative could have been: J(doesn’t VP)S K = λeφ.¬((VPS) e (λe′.φ e′)). But in this
case, the continuation would also have been in the scope of the negation: the rest of the discourse would
also be negated, which is not what we expect.
We propose to introduce the type of logical connectives κ = t → t → t and to interpret the
syntactic type of sentences as Js K = κ → γ → (κ → γ → t) → t. Then negation can be interpreted
as: J(doesn’t VP)S K = λceφ.¬((VPS) (¬c) e(λc′e′.¬(φ c′ e))). Without all the details, if we think
as c being the logical connective ∧, we have the result to be interpreted as ¬((VPS) ∨ ¬(φ e)) ≡
(¬(VPS)) ∧ (φ e) which is now the expected result. Interestingly, we see that it could also give access
to the discourse referents introduced by VPS to φ using the continuation λc′e′.¬(φ c′ e′). This, of
course, is not expected, except for proper nouns (which are “always on top” in DRT). We then see
how to add an additional left environment parameter for proper nouns (say e1) so that negation blocks
the discourse referents introduced by existentials (in e2) but propagates the ones introduced by proper
nouns. With the new value of Js K = κ → γ → γ → (κ → γ → γ → t) → t and of sentence
composition: Js1.s2 K = λce1e2φ.Js1 K c e1 e2(λc′e′1e′2.Js2 Kc′e′1e′2φ))3, the negation is now interpreted
as: Jdoesn’t K = λV Sce1e2φ.¬((V S) (¬c) e1 e2(λc′e′1e′2.¬(φ c′ e′1 e2))). Together with the following
interpretations:
JJohn K = λPce1e2φ.P j c (j :: e1) e2 φ
Jown K = λOS.S(λx.O(λyc′e′
1
e′
2
φ′.c′(ownx y)(φ′ c′ e′
1
e′
2
)))
Jcar K = λxce1e2φ.c(car x)(φ c e1 e2)
Ja K = λPQce1e2φ.∃x.[λφ
′.(P x c e1 e2 φ
′) ∧ (Qxc e1 e2 φ
′)](λc′e′
1
e′
2
.φce′
1
(x :: e′
2
))
Jit K = λP.P (sel (e1 ∪ e2))
Jis K = λAS.S(λxc′e′
1
e′
2
φ′.c′(A(λyc′′e′′
1
e′′
2
φ′′.⊤)x c′ e′
1
e′
2
φ′)(φ′ c′ e′
1
e′
2
))
Jred K = λPxce1e2φ.(P x c e1 e2 φ) ∧ (red x)
we can interpret:
Jown K(Ja KJcar K) = λS.S(λxce1e2φ.∃y.[λφ
′.(c(car y)(φ′ c e1 e2)) ∧ (c(own x y)(φ
′ce1e2))]
(λc′e′
1
e′
2
.φ c e′
1
(y :: e′
2
)))
≡ λS.S(λxce1e2φ.∃y.[λφ
′.c((car y) ∧ (ownx y))(φ′ c e1 e2)]
(λc′e′
1
e′
2
.φ c e′
1
(y :: e′
2
)))
= λS.S(λxce1e2φ.∃y.c((car y) ∧ (ownx y))(φ c e1 (y :: e2)))
thanks to the following equivalence (c is either ∧ or ∨):
(c(car y)(φ′ c e1 e2)) ∧ (c(own x y)(φ
′ce1e2))) ≡ c(car y ∧ ownx y)(φ
′ce1e2)
Finally, a discourse d such as John doesn’t own a car. It is red with the empty context nil and the
empty continuation φe = λce1e2.¬(c⊤⊥) (which returns ⊤ under the ∧ connective and ⊥ under the ∨
connective) is interpreted as:
Jd K (∧)nilnilφe = ¬(∃y.(car y ∧ own j y) ∨ (¬(red(sel((j :: nil) ∪ nil))) ∨ ⊥))
= ¬(∃y.(car y ∧ own j y) ∨ (¬(red(sel(j :: nil)))))
≡ (¬∃y.(car y ∧ own j y)) ∧ red(sel(j :: nil))
2
⊤ stands for true. That is, λe.⊤ is the continuation that always returns true.
3We use here a currified notation that introduces as many arrows as functions have parameters. We could of course use a
product or record type to keep only one parameter.
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It shows that whereas the discourse referent introduced by y is not accessible to the sel operator, the
discourse referent introduced by j would be accessible, in spite of the negation.
We extend this approach to model the RFC, introducing a parameter for the type of discourse rela-
tions: subordinating or coordinating, and two ways of combining sentences: s1.cs2 and s1.ss2 instead
of just one s1.s2. The interpretation of these two combinations manage the set of discourse referents so
that the environment given to s2 only includes the set of discourse referents defined by the RFC. As for
now, we only deal with discourse structures that can be described by a formula (or syntactic tree) made
of the .c and of the .s connectives. Discourse pops or discourse structure that are not trees, for instance,
are not yet considered.
We consider a new type κ = γ → γ → γ and Js K = κ → γ → γ → (κ → γ → γ → t) → t, and
we define Coord = λe1e2.e2 and Sub = λe1e2.e1 ∪ e2. We give the following definition of sentence
composition:
Js1.ss2 K = λce1e2φ.Js1 K c e1 e2(λc
′e′
1
e′
2
.Js2 K Sub e′1 (c e1 e2)φ)
Js1.cs2 K = λce1e2φ.Js1 K c e1 e2(λc
′e′
1
e′
2
.Js2 K Coord e′1 (c e1 e2)φ)
Then
Js1.c(s2.cs3) K = λce1e2φ.Js1 K c e1 e2(λc
′e′
1
e′
2
.Js2 K Coord e′1 (c e1 e2)
(λc′′′e′′′
1
e′′′
2
.Js3 K Coord e′′′1 (c e1 e2)φ))
Js1.c(s2.ss3) K = λce1e2φ.Js1 K c e1 e2(λc
′e′
1
e′
2
.Js2 K Coord e′1 (c e1 e2)
(λc′′′e′′′
1
e′′′
2
.Js3 K Sub e′′′1 (c e1 e2)φ))
Js1.s(s2.cs3) K = λce1e2φ.Js1 K c e1 e2(λc
′e′
1
e′
2
.Js2 K Sub e′1 (c e1 e2)
(λc′′′e′′′
1
e′′′
2
.Js3 K Coord e′′′1 (e′1 ∪ (c e1 e2))φ))
Js1.s(s2.ss3) K = λce1e2φ.Js1 K c e1 e2(λc
′e′
1
e′
2
.Js2 K Sub e′1 (c e1 e2)
(λc′′′e′′′
1
e′′′
2
.Js3 K Sub e′′′1 (e′1 ∪ (c e1 e2))φ))
which means that in addition to the environment introduced by their previous discourse unit (e′
1
for s2
and e′′
1
for s3), s2 and s3 have access to (c e1 e2) whose value is: either e2 if the whole part of the
discourse is in a coordinating relation with what comes before (and then only s1 should access e1), or
e1 ∪ e2 if the whole part is in a subordinating relation with what comes before (and the previous unit
dominates s1, s2 and s3 and each have access to e1 and e2).
Conclusion We show how [3]’s approach is flexible enough to model various accessibility constraints,
such as the ones for discourse referents introduced by proper nouns or by the hierarchical structure of
the discourse. Moreover, it proves to be able to combine the different constraints. We hope this could be
helpful to give an account of the hierarchy of referential expressions and their adequacy to the RFC [1]
by combining various constraints for pronouns or definite descriptions for instance.
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